Proposed Acquisition Teamwork and Cycle Time Improvements

We believe that such policies have always been dependent upon solid government/industry teamwork and shorter overall acquisition cycle time. Various underlying impediments in the defense acquisition process have worked at cross-purposes to these needs over the years and can again impede the new DoD-5000 initiatives.

We have identified some of the main obstacles to effective government/ industry teamwork, as well as reasons for today's long acquisition cycle time. The teamwork impediments include a group of solicitation and contracting practices which have caused characteristics from the fixed-price-development era to linger during the award and management of new programs. These have also combined with recent legislation to chill worthwhile cooperation during the pre-award period. Even the new DoD-5000 drafts convey a guarded approach to teamwork with industry; including guarded cooperation on the IPD/CAIV initiatives where solid teamwork is essential.

As to the long overall cycle time today's acquisitions are driven principally by the pipeline nature of the many phases, anchored around drawn-out EMD phases

The impediments to government/industry teamwork can be overcome by adoption of a pro-active roadmap, or trust-model, for government and industry to cooperate on the implementation of the new DoD-5000 policies. Although this can also help shorten today's long acquisition process, thoughtful consideration is also needed to making a major improvement in cycle time.

We propose the following strawman approach which can both represent a roadmap for teamwork and permit a system development process on the order of 3-5 years. By combining proven practices from successful military and commercial programs with team-based execution of the CAIV/OIPT principles, this approach replaces today's long, multi-phase process with a much shorter cycle. Industry and the OSD should work together to implement the details of this approach in implementation of the new acquisition policy documents.

DoD and Industry jointly should give thoughtful consideration to making watershed changes to shorten the process. Such changes need not be risky or unproven. A body of "lessons-learned" is available from successful military and commercial programs upon which to confidently structure a new process. Indeed, the use of integrated product development, combined with modern concurrent engineering and precision manufacturing tools, could permit a version of the recent ACTD concept to be the new acquisition norm, with a 3-5 year development cycle including initial fielding for user tactics and doctrine.

Such a new process, entitled "Evolutionary Defense Acquisition" (EDA), is summarized in the following section. It preserves and enhances the CAIV principles and the necessary teamwork outlined in earlier remarks, but replaces today's multi-phase cycle with a much shorter process. To provide a basis for full examination of EDA, implementation specifics are also set forth along with some of the key lessons-learned programs from which information was taken to formulate the process. Although there are actual recent programs used as models to form the EDA concept, the approach should also be "piloted" on a few programs for validation.

Evolutionary Defense Acquisition

The new process could be called "Evolutionary Defense Acquisition" (EDA), stressing an intent to replace today's culture with an affordable, incremental approach. The baseline for Major System development would be 5 years, including fielding and user Opeval of a battle group size production prototype lot. The Opeval would establish concepts of operation, tactics and doctrine for single and joint service use, determine readiness for full production and affirm the next level of required system growth. Equally important, the battle group prototypes would serve as a quick reaction warfighting resource, sustaining a modern, economic American defense structure and guarding against defacto disarmament under budget downsizing. The baseline for development of Non-Major Items would be 3 years or less, including fielding of a low-rate production lot for similar Opeval and contingency warfighting uses.

EDA would be built around an incremental approach to operational performance. "Threshold" requirements would apply to the initial battle group prototype or low-rate production fielding lots, with incremental "objectives" introduced later as system upgrades. The threshold would represent the minimum operational performance with current technology to make an initial system fielding, while the objective level would represent longer term goals which may be upgraded into the system in pace with evolving technology. These requirements would be managed using CAIV tradeoffs at milestones throughout development and Opeval to keep performance and cost in balance, avoid grand design systems and mitigate program risk.

EDA Implementation Details

Technology and Requirements Validation Before System Development

Acquisition Milestones and Approvals

Competitive Source Selections

Concurrent Engineering and Precision Manufacturing Technologies

Contracting Structure

Acquisition Teamwork

Past Successful Practices

• F-117 Tactical Fighter - This program has become a hallmark of successful acquisition practice. During a brief period in the 1980s, this highly advanced system was developed and fielded as a 59 aircraft wing, typical of smaller battle group deployments likely in the future. Operational requirements focused on a short list of three principal characteristics -- stealth signature, range and weapon accuracy. These were constantly traded off to foster heavy use of existing F-18, F-16 and F-15 subsystem assets, permitting funding to be focused on the new stealth technology. The development and fielding cycle was very short; non-value technical, management and financial reporting was excluded; and long term funding stability was emphasized to avoid year-to-year incremental funding disruption.

• Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) System - THAAD uses DoD-5000 phasing in a relatively positive way. During Phase I, an initial missile defense capability to combat today's basic threats is fielded for user operational evaluation. Phase II is to develop system upgrades for expanded capability. THAAD's strategy is important because it breaks away from the grand design culture for basic fielding and shortens development cycle time.

• X-31 Aircraft - This fine cooperative effort between the US and Germany used barebones funding, contract tasking and solid teamwork to fashion the first new X-Model program in decades. It was managed using approved "contractor plans" and, much like the F-117, it uses existing subsystems in areas not critical to its advanced combat aerodynamics.

• 777 Transport - This new air transport uses technology for incremental performance growth, affordability, safety and passenger comfort; rather than a grand design leap in capability. Emphasis on long term supplier relationships achieved unprecedented reductions of lead time to less than a year; not on counterproductive recompetitions or second sourcing which cause data rights issues and preclude long term logistic support/maintenance by the original team. Oversight and reporting is principally to support FAA inspection and safety needs.

• Precision Location GPS Receiver (PLGR) - This 17,000 unit program is a fine example of the use of commercial practices on a military requirement. The contractor developed the equipment outside of the DoD-5000 process and the production offer permitted the government to either reduce or eliminate DoD-5000 mil-specs, standards, data, clauses and overhead cost. Reductions within the procuring agencies authority provided 20% savings and full elimination of DoD-5000 requirements would have provided a 37% savings.